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Abstract 
In order to be counted as autonomous, a weapons system must perform the critical functions of 
target selection and engagement without any intervention by human operators. Human rights 
organizations, as well as a growing number of States, have been arguing for banning weapons 
systems satisfying this condition – that are usually referred to as autonomous weapons system 
(AWS) on this account – and for maintaining a meaningful human control (MHC) over any 
weapons systems. This twofold goal has been pursued by leveraging on ethical and legal arguments, 
which spell out a variety of deontological or consequentialist reasons. Roughly speaking, 
deontological arguments support the conclusion that by deploying AWS one is likely or even bound 
to violate moral and legal obligations of special sorts of agents (military commanders and operators) 
or moral and legal rights of special sorts of patients (AWS potential victims). Consequentialist 
arguments substantiate the conclusion that prohibiting AWS is expected to protect peace and 
security, thereby enhancing collective human welfare, more effectively than the incompatible 
choice of permitting their use. Contrary to a widespread view, this paper argues that deontological 
and consequentialist reasons can be coherently combined so as to provide mutually reinforcing 
ethical and legal reasons for banning AWS. To this end, a confluence model is set forth that enables 
one to solve potential conflicts between these two approaches, by prioritizing deontological 
arguments over consequentialist ones. Finally, it is maintained that the proposed confluence model 
significantly bears on the issue of what it is to exercise genuine MHC on existing and future AWS. 
Indeed, full autonomy is allowed by the confluence model in the case of some anti-materiel 
defensive AWS; it is to be curbed instead in the case of both lethal AWS and future AWS which 
may  seriously jeopardize peace and stability. 
 
1. Introduction 
A weapons system must perform the critical functions of target selection and engagement without 
any intervention by human operators in order to be counted as autonomous. In the last few years, 
the development and use of systems satisfying this condition (and usually called AWS – 
autonomous weapons systems – on this account) have become an issue of common concern for 
States, International Organizations and NGOs, which have been debating the way forward on AWS, 
on a fairly regular basis, both in formal and informal fora.1 Remarkably enough, since 2014, an 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal AWS (a.k.a. as LAWS) has been held annually in Geneva 
within the institutional framework of the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), 
gathering an ever-increasing number of States. A formal discussion on AWS among CCW State 
Parties was held at the Fifth Review CCW Conference (12-16 December 2016),2 where it was 
decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal AWS, with the 
mandate of “submit[ting] a report to the 2017 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 
Convention consistent with” the recommendations issued in the Report of the 2016 Informal 
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,3 namely “to explore and agree on 
possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of L[ethal] AWS, 
in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, taking into account all proposals – 
past, present and future”.4  
Awareness about this topic has been raised by the Campaign ‘Stop Killer Robots’, which was 
launched in 2013 by an international coalition of NGOs with the primary goal of “ban[ning] lethal 
robot weapons”5  – a goal subsequently endorsed, in a 2015 Open letter, by a surprisingly large 
group of high-profile experts in the fields of robotics and Artificial Intelligence.6 Over the years, the 
                                                          
1 A fairly comprehensive chronology of the initiatives taken in this respect at international and national levels is 
available at: www.stopkillerrobots.org.  
2 All transcripts and documents of the CCW Meetings of Experts as well as of the Fifth Review Conference are 
available at: www.unog.ch.  
3 Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference, 23 December 2016, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.V/10, Decision 1. The 
Group of Governmental Experts was scheduled to hold its first session from 21 to 25 August 2017 and its second 
session from 13 to 17 November 2017. Regrettably, however, due to financial constraints, the first session was 
cancelled. See Stop Killer Robots, Diplomatic Efforts to Address Killer Robots Falter Convention on Conventional 
Weapons Talks Cancelled Due to Lack of Funds, May 30, 2017, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_PR_CCW_30May2017fnl.pdf (accessed June 5, 2017). 
4 Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 10 June 2016, 
UN Doc. CCW/CONF.V/2, Annex para. 3. 
5 Stop Killer Robots, Urgent Action Needed to Ban Fully Autonomous Weapons. Non-governmental organizations 
convene to launch Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, May 30, 2013, http://stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/KRC_LaunchStatement_23Apr2013.pdf (accessed June 5, 2017). 
6 Future of Life Institute, Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers, July 28, 2015, 
https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons (accessed June 5, 2017; hereinafter 2015 Open Letter). The 
Open letter was signed, among others, by Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Jaan Tallinn and Frank Wilczek. The call for a 
ban has been also endorsed by the EU Parliament, which adopted a resolution calling on “the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the Council to: […] (d) ban the development, production 
Campaign’s focus has apparently shifted from calling a ban on lethal AWS to requesting 
meaningful human control (MHC) on weapons systems. However, this shift does not represent a 
radical turn in the overall Campaign strategy. As we shall see, particularly restrictive interpretations 
of MHC are licensed by some (deontological) arguments against AWS that were formulated by 
AWS ban supporters even before the MHC issue came to the fore. 
One should be careful to note that arguments for banning AWS are not, in general, limited in their 
scope to lethal AWS. One may additionally express concerns about threats for peace and global 
stability which may arise from AWS which have no direct lethal or sublethal effect on human 
beings. A significant case in point concerns applications of swarm intelligence technologies which 
may enable one to level massive attacks on possibly uninhabited enemy infrastructures.7  
The ambitious goal of aiming for a treaty prohibiting AWS which in principle is not limited to 
lethal AWS must address the challenge of merging coherently into a unitary ethical and legal 
framework both deontological and consequence-looking approaches to AWS, which usually do not 
share the same background assumptions and may even reach conflicting conclusions. We will 
address here this substantive merging problem, with the aim of outlining a coherent ethical and 
legal framework in support of a ban proposal which is not limited to lethal AWS.  
One can readily appreciate the existence of a substantive merging problem by reflecting on the 
variety of assumptions that one finds in both ethical and legal arguments for prohibiting AWS. In 
normative ethics, reasons for prohibiting AWS have been put forward from both deontological and 
consequentialist standpoints. Roughly speaking, deontological arguments aim to support the 
conclusion that by deploying those weapons one is likely or even bound to violate moral obligations 
of special sorts of agents (military commanders and operators) or moral rights of special sorts of 
patients (human beings that are potential victims of AWS). Consequentialist arguments do not start 
from inalienable rights and absolute duties, and rather aim to support the conclusion that AWS 
which threaten peace and security must be prohibited in order to preserve and enhance collective 
human welfare. At the same time, however, it is hard to develop sound consequentialist arguments 
for banning every lethal AWS, including those lethal AWS that fail to pose significant threats to 
aggregate human welfare. Hence, potential tensions may arise between deontological and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
and use of fully autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention”. See European 
Parliament, Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, 27 February 2014, 2014/2567(RSP), para. 2. 
7 The US Department of Defense is already testing swarms of autonomous micro-drones. See US Department of 
Defense, Department of Defense Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration, January 9, 2017. 
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-
announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/see US Department of Defense 2017 (accessed June 5, 2017). 
consequentialist reasons in normative ethics that are advanced from one and the same AWS ban 
advocacy perspective. 
Arguments based on international law have been developing along similar lines. On the one hand, it 
has been maintained that the deployment of AWS would be in stark contrast with the basic 
(deontological) tenets of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law 
(IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL). On the other hand, in an ostensibly consequentialist 
perspective, the proliferation of AWS has been claimed to make wars easier to wage, with 
inevitable backlashes on the prohibition on the use of force (art. 2, para. 4 of the U.N. Charter) and, 
more generally, on the maintenance of international peace and security (art. 1, para. 1 of the U.N. 
Charter). 
The present paper acknowledges some limitations of each pro-ban argument taken in isolation and 
the potential conflicts that may arise between arguments that are based on deontological and 
consequentialist assumptions. Nevertheless, it is argued here that these potential conflicts can be 
defused, thereby enabling one to take advantage for ban advocacy purposes of the complementary 
and mutually reinforcing character of deontological and consequentialist arguments. This is 
achieved by introducing a confluence mode, which enables one to solve conflicts between 
deontological and consequentialist approaches in the AWS domain of application. Moreover, it is 
maintained that the proposed model is justified by reference to the hierarchy of sources of 
international legal order. Finally, the implications of this model towards a restrictive interpretation 
of MHC are explored with reference to a variety of existing and technologically possible AWS. It 
turns out that this model allows for full autonomy in the case of some anti-materiel defensive AWS, 
requires one to prohibit the autonomy of lethal AWS in view of deontological reasons, and to curb 
in view of consequentialist reasons the autonomy of AWS which may have a destabilizing impact, 
irrespective of whether the latter have any direct lethal effect on human beings. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, various requirements that have been put forward for 
a weapons system to count as autonomous are analyzed. The more liberal requirement on AWS, 
which is satisfied by various existing weapon systems, is adopted on a precautionary basis for 
discussion among stakeholders, and compared to more restrictive requirements which end up 
projecting AWS in some undetermined technological future. Moreover, it is pointed out that the 
recent shift in focus from the notion of “autonomy” to that of “meaningful human control” (or lack 
thereof) enable one to sidestep the need to resolve the AWS definitional conundrum in connection 
with most current debates about AWS (2.1). The merging problem for ethical and legal arguments 
against AWS is addressed and analyzed by reference to the broad categories of the deontological 
and consequentialist approaches in sections 3 and 4, respectively. To combine coherently 
deontological and consequentialist reasons into a unitary ethical and legal framework, a confluence 
model is proposed in section 5. This model prioritizes deontological perspectives whenever agent-
relative obligations and patient-relative rights are applicable, and shifts by default to agent-neutral 
consequentialist perspectives whenever those obligations and rights are no longer applicable. In 
section 6, this confluence model is informatively applied to determine what level of human control 
is to be exerted on existing weapon systems which, according to the more liberal requirement for 
autonomy, can already operate in autonomous mode. Section 7 concludes by distilling the legal 
outputs which can be drawn from the proposed confluence model. 
 
2. On the Notion of Autonomy in AWS Ethical and Legal Debates 
Ethical and legal debates on AWS are usually based on a construal of autonomy in terms of task-
execution or goal-achievement capabilities and related information-processing skills for 
technological devices.8 A demanding requirement along these lines was advanced in a document of 
the UK Ministry of Defense. There, an autonomous system is required to be “a system which is 
capable of understanding higher level intent and direction. From this understanding and its 
perception of its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to bring about the 
desired state”.9 These requirements are hardly satisfied by any existing weapons system. Moreover, 
no educated guess can be made about the prospects of constructing machines which are capable of 
understanding high level intent and direction, unless one redefines these terms operationally and 
quite differently from common usage. Therefore, on the basis of common linguistic usage, the UK 
Ministry of Defense definition projects AWS in some undetermined technological future.10 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) proposed a less demanding requirement on weapons systems 
to count as autonomous. Indeed, autonomous weapons systems must be capable, “once activated, to 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator”.11 Much of the ongoing 
                                                          
8 Guglielmo Tamburrini, “On banning autonomous weapon systems: from deontological to wide consequentialist 
reasons” in Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy, Ed. Nehal Bhuta et al. (Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 122, 124-127 (hereinafter Tamburrini, On banning AWS). 
9 UK Ministry of Defence, The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, 30 March 2011, 
14 (emphasis added). 
10 Coherently with this premise, the UK has boldly affirmed that AWS “do not, and may never, exist”. See the Opening 
Statement by the UK delegation at the 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts (General Exchange, 1).  
11 US Department of Defense, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, Directive 3000.09, 21 November 2012, 13-14 
(hereinafter DoD Directive). A largely overlapping requirement for autonomy has been adopted by the International 
Committee for the Red Cross, which refers to “weapons that can independently select and attack targets, i.e. with 
autonomy in the ‘critical functions’ of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets”. See ICRC, Autonomous 
weapon systems: Technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects. Expert meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 
March 2014, 1 November 2014, 3. 
ethical, legal and political discussion on AWS takes the DoD requirement for autonomy as a 
starting point, identifying without any further ado an autonomous weapons system with a system 
satisfying the DoD requirement.12 Nevertheless, in these discussions the DoD requirement is 
usually refined and suitably adapted to various classes of AWS, insofar as the required autonomy is 
always relative to some set of warfare environments, and to the specific perceptual, reasoning and 
action capabilities that the weapon system is endowed with.13  
One should carefully note that by taking the DoD requirement as a definition of AWS licenses as 
autonomous a variety of presently operating weapons systems.14 These include anti-materiel 
defensive systems like the German Nächstbereichschutzsystem MANTIS and the Israeli Iron Dome, 
active protective systems for vehicles (e.g. the South-African/Swedish LEDS-150), loitering 
weapons systems like the Israeli anti-radiation Harpy and Harop systems, a variety of offensive fire-
and-forget munitions, like the British Brimstone missile, and stationary (i.e. non-mobile) robotic 
sentinels, like the South-Korean Super aEgis II, which surveils the border between North and South 
Korea, and the gun tower developed by the Turkish company ASELSAN to be installed on the 
border between Turkey and Syria.15 Thus, if one accepts the DoD requirement as an adequate 
criterion to discriminate between autonomous and non-autonomous weapons systems, then one is 
ipso facto acknowledging that some AWS exist and have been actually deployed in various warfare 
scenarios.16 Accordingly, the ethical, legal, and political discussions of AWS that are based on the 
DoD requirement cannot be construed as discussions concerning future combat systems only. This 
far-reaching implication of the methodological choice of accepting the DoD requirement as a 
definition in ethical, legal, and political discussions of AWS is aptly illustrated by reference to the 
                                                          
12 See, among many others, Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity. The Case against Killer Robots, November 19, 
2012, 7-8 (hereinafter HRW, Losing Humanity); Cristof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, 9 April 2013, para. 38 (hereinafter Heyns Report); Michael 
N. Schmitt, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics.” Harvard 
National Security Journal Features 1(2013): 1, 4 (hereinafter Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems); Rebecca 
Crootof, “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications.” Cardozo Law Review 36(2015): 1837, 1847 
(hereinafter Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here); Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti “The obligation to exercise 
discretion in warfare: why autonomous weapons systems are unlawful” in Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, 
Policy, Ed. Nehal Bhuta et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 245, 249; Duncan B. Hollis, “Setting the Stage: 
Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International Humanitarian Law.” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 
30(2016): 1, 6. 
13 See, for instance, the Working Paper presented by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the 2016 
CCW Meeting of Experts (Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on autonomous weapon 
system, 11 April 2016, 3-4; hereinafter ICRC Working Paper).  
14 For a more refined and comprehensive survey on existing autonomous weapons systems, see the dataset processed as 
part of the project on “Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weapons, and Meaningful Human Control” (Principal 
investigators: Heather Roff and Richard Moyes), available at: https://globalsecurity.asu.edu/robotics-autonomy 
(accessed June 5, 2017). 
15 Yeni Şafak, Turkey starts building automatic shooting gun towers at Syrian border, May 30, 2016, 
http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkey-starts-building-automatic-shooting-gun-towers-at-syrian-border-2473487 
(accessed June 5, 2017). For more information about the ASELSAN Stabilized Gun Platform, see www.aselsan.com.tr. 
16 Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here; ICRC Working Paper. 
previously mentioned Iron Dome, Brimstone, and Super aEgis II. Let us briefly consider each one 
of these systems in turn. 
The Iron Dome system was primarily designed to counter incoming short-range rockets. Human 
operators feed the system in advance with information concerning the area to be protected from 
incoming rockets. On the basis of this information, the system detects the launch of a rocket and 
tracks its trajectory in order to determine whether the incoming projectile threatens the designated 
area. Only if a threat is detected, an interceptor missile is fired to destroy the incoming rocket. In 
principle, human operators can override the system’s firing decision.17 Yet, since veto should be 
exercised within a prohibitively short time frame (a matter of split seconds), operators will be 
generally unwilling (and in many cases utterly unable) to challenge the assessment made by the 
system, which will therefore operate in a de facto autonomous mode.18 Accordingly, the critical 
target selection and attack functionalities mentioned in the DoD requirement are both performed 
without a human operator being really able to intervene. 
Brimstone is an air-to-ground attack missile which works either as fire-and-forget munition or as 
laser-guided missile. In the fire-and-forget mode, Brimstone is loaded with targeting data, including 
data which serve to circumscribe the area within which armored enemy vehicles must be searched 
for, selected and attacked without any further intervention by human operators.  In the laser-guided 
mode, human operators pick out the specific targets to destroy.19 Thus, Brimstone missiles satisfy 
the DoD requirement for autonomy in the fire-and-forget mode, and fail to satisfy the same 
requirement in the laser-guided mode. The operation mode is selected by human operators on the 
basis of available information about individual attack scenarios (e.g. considering whether there are 
civilians or friendly forces in the vicinity of targets). 
The DoDAAM system Super aEgis II is a stationary robotic platform designed to replace or to assist 
South Korean sentinels in the surveillance of the demilitarized zone between North and South 
Korea.20 The Super aEgis II can be operated in either unsupervised or supervised modes. In the 
unsupervised mode, the Super aEgis II identifies and tracks intruders in the demilitarized zone, 
deciding whether to fire at them or not without any further intervention by human operators. In the 
supervised mode, firing actions are contingent on the judgment and the “go” command of a human 
operator.21 Thus, the Super aEgis II satisfies the DoD requirement if it operates in the unsupervised 
                                                          
17 See http://www.army-technology.com/projects/irondomeairdefencemi/ (accessed June 5, 2017) 
18 HRW, Losing Humanity, 12-13. 
19 See http://www.army-technology.com/projects/brimstone/ (accessed June 5, 2017). 
20 See http://www.dodaam.com/eng/sub2/menu2_1_4.php# (accessed June 5, 2017). 
21  Simon Parkin, “Killer Robots: The soldiers that never sleep”, BBC, July 16, 2015 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep (accessed June 5, 2017). 
mode, and it does not otherwise. In the latter case, it is best viewed as a combination of a decision-
support system with a remote-controlled firing device. It is worth noting that the supervised Super 
aEgis II preserves most of the critical functions in the DoD requirement, insofar as it performs 
without any human intervention the tasks of target identification and tracking in its intended 
operational environment. Accordingly, this robotic sentinel affords a straightforward illustration of 
the fact that a simple on/off operational mode switch can make all the difference between an 
autonomous and a non-autonomous weapon system in the light of the DoD requirement on AWS as 
a binary discrimination criterion.22 
By accepting the DoD requirements as a binary discrimination criterion, one is ipso facto 
committed to recognize the existence and actual deployment of several types of AWS, contrary to 
what was asserted by various representatives of State parties at CCW informal meetings of experts 
in Geneva between 2014 and 2016.23 Moreover, it is worth noting that the distinctions between 
stationary/mobile or, more problematically, between defensive/offensive weapons systems are 
irrelevant to the problem of deciding whether a weapons system should be counted as autonomous 
or not on the basis of the DoD criterion. Indeed, Super aEgis II is a stationary system, and the 
Brimstone missile is not; the former is a defensive system and the latter is not. Fine-grained 
distinctions in terms of the types and levels perceptual and cognitive capabilities appear to be 
similarly immaterial with respect to this discrimination problem, insofar as the pattern matching 
capabilities that are required as a precondition for attacking a short-range rocket are quite different 
from the perceptual and cognitive capabilities that are required of a robotic sentry to recognize a 
human target or of an air-to-ground missile to identify armored enemy vehicles chiefly on the basis 
of their visual models.  
Using the DoD requirements as an operational criterion enabling one to distinguish between 
autonomous and non-autonomous weapons systems is in some respects unsatisfactory, at least 
insofar as these requirements force one to place in the same AWS class both defensive systems like 
the Iron Dome, which exclusively reacts to and targets incoming short range rockets, and any future 
offensive system which will be supposedly capable to operate autonomously in the fog of war, and 
to discriminate active foes from civilians and hors de combat enemies in cluttered urban warfare 
scenarios. It was noted above that this inconvenience cannot be overcome by endorsing the 
                                                          
22 Tamburrini, On Banning AWS, 126. 
23 In addition to the stance taken by the UK, mentioned above (note 10), this view was expressed, on the basis of 
equally strict requirements of autonomy, by Argentina (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Closing Statement), Denmark 
(2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), France (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Working Paper on 
“Characterization of a Lethal AWS”), Germany (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, Final Statement), Italy (2016 CCW 
Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel “Towards a Working Definition of Lethal AWS”), Japan (2016 CCW 
Meeting of Experts, Working Paper), Sweden (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Opening Statement), and Turkey (2016 
CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange).  
prohibitively restrictive UK condition on autonomy. At the same time, in order to introduce a new 
definition of AWS striking a good balance between liberal and restrictive definitions, one has to 
address the formidable problem of identifying a non-arbitrary cutting point in between the 
perceptual, cognitive, and action capabilities of systems like the Iron Dome on the one hand, and 
those characterizing the envisaged AWS that will be capable of matching infantryman skills in 
cluttered urban warfare scenarios. 
At a closer look, this question resembles the long-standing (and possibly unending) philosophical 
discussion as to what intelligence and intelligent behavior are in connection with the aims and 
achievements of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Cognitive Robotics and cognate disciplines. Yet, one 
cannot reasonably expect to make the establishment of an international regime for AWS conditional 
upon the solution of such theoretical conundrum. On a precautionary basis, therefore, the more 
liberal requirement put forth by the DoD - however imperfect - should be preferred as a basis for 
distinguishing between AWS and other weapons systems. In this way, it is possible to avoid 
deferring the discussion on AWS regulation to some undetermined technological future, if and 
when the highly restrictive requirements envisaged by the UK conditions will be met. 
 
2.1 From “autonomy” to “(lack of) meaningful human control”  
 
The uncertainties surrounding the meaning of “autonomy” in the expression “autonomous weapons 
systems” should not be overemphasized for our present purposes. In the current debate on AWS, the 
quest for a shared notion of autonomy has been gradually losing ground in favor of a (brand-new) 
definitional dispute concerning the expression “meaningful human control”. Apparently, NGOs, 
diplomats and scholars are getting less and less interested in attaining precise operational definitions 
enabling one to decide, for each existing and developmental weapons system, whether it is 
autonomous or not. To be investigated, rather, is what kind or level of human control must on 
ethical and legal grounds be exercised on weapons systems.  
The idea whereby all weapons (thus including AWS) should be subject to a meaningful human 
control was ushered in by Article 36, a UK-based NGO, in a 2013 Paper commenting upon the 
aforementioned UK Ministry of Defense’s Joint Doctrine.24 This formula, which was refined in 
subsequent policy briefs, turned out to be particularly successful and soon influenced the overall 
Campaign strategy. Significantly enough, in a 2014 report, Human Rights Watch has come to 
                                                          
24 Article 36, Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons, April, 2013, 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Policy_Paper1.pdf (accessed June 5, 2017). 
define AWS as those which “would identify and fire on targets without meaningful human 
intervention”.25 Likewise, the 2015 Open Letter concludes with a call for a “ban on offensive 
autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control”.26 The (lack of) meaningful human 
control is thereby embodied and plays a crucial role in the very definition of autonomous weapons, 
with the consequence that the campaign for banning AWS and that for introducing a MHC 
requirement end up pursuing partially overlapping goals. And clearly, the more restrictive is the 
interpretation one gives to the MHC requirement, the more inclusive is the class of lethal AWS that 
ipso facto ought to be prohibited. This point was vividly made by Kerstin Vignard, Deputy to the 
Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), when she observed at the 2016 
CCW Informal Meeting of Experts that “[u]ltimately the autonomy question is really about what 
control/oversight do we expect humans to maintain over the tools of violence that we employ”.27  
As anticipated, the case for MHC, unlike the original pro-ban campaign, has rapidly attracted the 
interest of an increasing number of States, which have been using it as a viable starting point for the 
discussion on Lethal AWS at the CCW Informal Meetings of Experts.28 As a consequence of this, it 
has been questioned whether the notion of MHC already gathered (or is going to gather in a near 
future) a sufficient consensus for giving birth to a new norm of customary international law.29  
In fact, if framed in these terms, the search for a legal basis of a MHC requirement on autonomous 
weapons systems is bound to fail for (at least) three reasons. First, to date the notion of MHC has 
been expressly endorsed by little more than two dozens of States: this constitutes at best a 
manifestation of opinio iuris by a (non-negligible) group of States, but this is clearly insufficient to 
infer the existence - even at an inchoate stage - of a customary norm. Second, the evidentiary value 
                                                          
25 Human Rights Watch, Shaking the Foundations: The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots, May 12, 2014, 1 
(hereinafter HRW, Shaking the Foundations). 
26 In a similar vein, see Maina Kiai and Christof Heyns, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 67(f) (“Autonomous weapons 
systems that require no meaningful human control should be prohibited […]”) and African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life 
(Article 4), 57th Ordinary Session, 4-18 November 2015, para. 35 (hereinafter African Commission, General Comment 
No. 3) (“Any machine autonomy in the selection of human targets or the use of force should be subject to meaningful 
human control”). 
27 Kerstin Vignard, Statement of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research at the CCW Informal Meeting of Experts 
on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016, http://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/unidir-s-statement-to-
the-ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-eng-0-648.pdf (accessed June 5, 2017). 
28 Dustin A. Lewis, Gabriella Blum, and Naz K. Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm Accountability, Harvard Law School 
Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, Research Briefing, August 2016, 62 (hereinafter Lewis, Blum and 
Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm). See also UNIDIR, The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: 
Considering how Meaningful Human Control might move the discussion forward, 2014, 
http://www.unidir.ch/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-meaningful-human-control-might-move-the-discussion-
forward-en-615.pdf (accessed June 5, 2017). 
29 Peter Asaro, “Jus nascendi, robotic weapons and the Martens Clause” in Robot Law, Ed. by Ryan Calo et al. (Edward 
Elgar, 2016) 367. 
of these declarations is somehow diminished by the fact that they mostly come from States which 
would not be “specially affected” by an international regime on AWS, as they would not be able in 
any case to develop this technology in a foreseeable future,30 with the notable exception of the 
United Kingdom.31 Third, the formation of a new norm of customary international law is fatally 
hindered by disagreements among States as to what the introduction of a MHC requirement would 
specifically entail.32  
These difficulties should not lead one to relinquish the case for MHC, though. Indeed, they all 
derive from asking the wrong question at the outset: the point is not whether a rule imposing MHC 
on autonomous weapons has been emerging as a new customary norm; rather it should be 
investigated whether such a rule can be inferred from the existing international legal framework. 
Our contention is that it can be, building upon international humanitarian law, international criminal 
law, and international human rights law. Furthermore, we will argue that the very same ethical and 
legal considerations which substantiate the existence of an MHC requirement in international law 
provide a sound guidance as to the level of control that humans have to exercise on weapons 
systems.  
In the next two sections, therefore, the main arguments originally framed in the AWS ban debate, 
and hence supporting the existence of an MHC requirement will be analyzed in turn, distinguishing 
- as mentioned above - those crafted in decidedly deontological terms from those having a more 
consequentialist orientation.  
 
3. Deontological Perspectives on Banning AWS 
A rich family of arguments for banning AWS are framed in deontological terms, with solid 
underpinnings in international law. Deontological arguments for banning AWS can be 
informatively classified into three groups on the basis of the claims that each one of them is meant 
to buttress. First, AWS would be unable to comply with various obligations flowing from both IHL 
and IHRL rules governing the use of lethal force. Second, to the extent that they take humans ‘out-
of-the-loop’, AWS are likely to determine an accountability gap. And the latter is hardly 
                                                          
30 Lewis, Blum and Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm, 58. 
31 In response to a joint letter from UK members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, sent to the Foreign Secretary, a 
high-profile UK officer declared that “[i]t is the policy of the Government that the operation of our weapons will always 
be under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and accountability for weapons use.” 
See Article 36, UK government: Defining ‘human control’ essential at killer robots talks in 2017, January 12, 2017, 
http://www.article36.org/autonomous-weapons/uk-govt-response-2017/ (accessed June 5, 2017).  
32 Rebecca Crootof, “A Meaning Floor for ‘Meaningful Human Control’” Temple International & Comparative Law 
Journal 30(2016): 53, 55-56. 
 
reconcilable with the agent-relative moral obligation of military commanders and operators to be 
accountable for their own actions, as well as with the related principle of individual criminal 
responsibility under ICL. Third, the deployment of AWS would run contrary to a central 
foundational value of both IHL and IHRL, namely human dignity and the patient-relative rights that 
come with it, which require that the taking of human life should be reserved to human decision-
makers. Let us turn to examine the main reasons that have been adduced for each one of these 
claims. 
 
3.1 AWS are Unable to Comply with IHL and IHRL Rules Governing the Use of Lethal Force 
The main legal norms appealed to in deontological arguments for banning AWS are the IHL rules 
of distinction33 and proportionality.34 It is seriously doubted that AWS will be able, in the 
foreseeable future, to comply with these rules in a wide variety of warfare scenarios.35 An AWS 
complying with IHL requirements is usually taken to be an autonomous weapon which is capable of 
respecting the principles of distinction and proportionality at least as well as a competent and 
                                                          
33 Article 48, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(hereinafter AP I) (“[…] the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives”). See also Articles 51, para. 2 (“The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. […]”) and 52, para. 1 AP I (“Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack  
or of reprisals”). According to the codification of customary IHL rules edited by the ICRC, this rule has acquired the 
status of customary international law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3-8 (hereinafter ICRC’s Study on Customary IHL). 
34 The rule of proportionality prohibits “[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited”. See ICRC’s Study on Customary IHL, 46. References 
to this rule may be found in Articles 51, para. 5(b) and 57 para. 2 (a)(iii) and (b) AP I. 
35 Noel Sharkey, “The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare”, International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) 94 
(2012): 787 (hereinafter Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare); David Akerson, “The Illegality of 
Offensive Lethal Autonomy” in International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War, Ed. Dan Saxon 
(Brill, 2013) 65; Heyns Report, paras. 63-74; Chantal Grut, “The Challenge of Autonomous Lethal Robotics to 
International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 18(2013): 5 (hereinafter Grut, The Challenge of 
Autonomous Lethal Robotics); Jeroen van den Boogaard, “Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems”, Journal 
of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 6(2015): 247 (hereinafter van Boogard, Proportionality and AWS); Kjølv 
Egeland, “Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian Law”, Nordic Journal of 
International Law 85(2016): 89 (hereinafter Egeland, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems). This issue has also been 
raised, although with different overtones, by many of the delegations intervened at the CCW Meetings of Experts. See 
the views expressed by Argentina (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Closing Statement), Austria (2015 CCW Meeting of 
Experts, Working Paper “The concept of ‘meaningful human control’”), Cuba (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, 
Working Paper, 2015), Ecuador (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), the Holy See (2015 CCW 
Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on Overarching Issues), Norway (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Opening 
Statement); Pakistan (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), South Africa (2014 CCW Meeting of 
Experts, Opening Statement), Sweden (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on “Legal Aspects – 
International Humanitarian Law”), Switzerland (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on “Challenges 
to International Humanitarian Law”), and United Kingdom (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on 
“Challenges to International Humanitarian Law”).     
conscientious human soldier. The possibility of an AWS fulfilling IHL in this sense presupposes the 
solution of many profound research problems in advanced robotics and AI.36  
On the one hand, while present-day UAVs “cannot distinguish a sleeping dog from a bush, even at 
high noon,”37 the rule of distinction raises the problem of endowing AWS with the capability of 
perceptually distinguishing civilians and hors de combat people in erratic and surprise seeking 
warfare environments, in addition to the capability of establishing whether civilians have lost 
protection from attacks because of their participation into hostilities.38 Thus, in particular, AWS 
must be capable of recognizing behaviors that conventionally or unconventionally carry hostile or 
surrender messages and fighting incapacitation information, on the basis of a variety of perceptual 
and cognitive capabilities, including viewpoint-independent recognition of bodily postures and 
gestures in the variable perceptual conditions of unstructured warfare scenarios, understanding of 
emotional expressions, and real-time reasoning about deceptive intentions and actions.  
On the other hand, the proportionality rule requires the decision-maker to strike a delicate balance 
between military gains expectedly deriving from some given course of action and harms to civilians 
(in terms of life loss and injuries or damages to civilian objects) ensuing from it. In fact, it is argued, 
a proper appraisal of the terms of this balance, as well as of their interactions can hardly be carried 
out by present and foreseeable AI systems,39 especially insofar as it requires advanced social 
interaction competence and high sensitivity to the emotional and cognitive context, in addition to 
the military commander’s evaluation of human factors which include the shared viewpoints and 
feelings arising in soldiers on account of extended periods of communal daily life, training, and 
field experience.   
This point can be further elucidated with an example. Let us consider a simplified military scenario 
where the decision-maker faces the following two options: Option A, which will yield substantial 
military advantage, is likely to provoke a significant amount of civilian casualties; and Option B, 
which will cause less damage to the enemy, is unlikely to harm civilians. A military commander 
who has decided that the proportionality principle is respected in option A might still refrain from 
                                                          
36 Noel Sharkey, “Saying ‘no!’ to lethal autonomous targeting”, Journal of Military Ethics 9(2010): 369, 378; Ronald 
Arkin, “Lethal autonomous systems and the plight of the non-combatant”, AISB Quarterly 137 (2013): 1, 4 (hereinafter 
Arkin, Lethal autonomous systems).  
37 Lora G. Weiss, “Autonomous Robots in the Fog of War”, IEEE Spectrum, July 27, 2011, 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/military-robots/autonomous-robots-in-the-fog-of-war (accessed June 5, 2017). 
38 Philip Alston, “Lethal Robotic Technologies: The Implications for Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law”, Journal of Law, Information and Science 21(2011): 35, 54 (hereinafter Alston, Lethal Robotic Technologies); 
Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 788-789; Grut, The Challenge of Autonomous Lethal Robotics, 
11-12; Robin Geiss, The International-Law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
October 2015, 14 (hereinafter Geiss, The International-Law Dimension of AWS). 
39 Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 789-790; Heyns Report, paras. 70-73; Grut, The Challenge of 
Autonomous Lethal Robotics, 12-14; Egeland, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, 103-105. 
following this course of action on account of the nefarious impact which, knowing well her or his 
soldiers and sharing with them daily warfare hardships, she or he deems that the killing of civilians 
will have on the troops’ morale. This negative effect will in fact, according to her or his best 
judgment, jeopardize in the long run the possibility of defeating the enemy in the given operational 
theatre. It is presently difficult to imagine technologically foreseeable machines which are capable 
of gauging the psychological state of the troops involved in a conflict and the related knock-on 
strategic effects. Accordingly, a military commander delegating in similar scenarios the task of 
appraising the implications of the proportionality rule and the ensuing operational decisions to an 
AWS would ipso facto violate an agent-relative obligation attached to her or his special role of 
commander in a warfare theatre. 
Additional concerns have been raised in relation to the AWS’ ability to comply with the rule of 
precaution in attacks, which supplements the aforementioned rules of distinction and proportionality 
by obligating warring parties to take all feasible steps to avoid, or at least to minimize, the harm 
caused to innocent civilians.40 The focus, here, is basically on the concept of “feasibility” which, 
similarly to those of “civilians taking part in the hostilities” and “disproportionate collateral 
damage” referred above, requires complex contextual evaluations which are unlikely to be 
adequately performed in the foreseeable future by a non-human decision-maker.41 
Similar arguments have been put forward with reference to IHRL, having particular regard to the 
right to life and to bodily integrity. Notably, it has been submitted that, should AWS be deployed 
outside the context of an armed conflict, as a means of law enforcement (e.g. to quell a riot or to 
control a border42), the thorny problems emphasized in relation to IHL would assume an even 
greater magnitude. Since the notions of “legitimate object of attack” and “collateral damages” are 
not contemplated under IHRL, lawful killings are considered there as an exception, subject to very 
strict conditions. Indeed, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, despite similarities in 
wording, are construed far more stringently than in IHL, which makes the hypothetical tasks of a 
law enforcement AWS even more difficult to fulfill.43 
                                                          
40 Art. 57 AP I. On the customary nature of this principle, see ICRC’s Study on Customary IHL, 51-67. 
41 Nathalie Weizmann and Milena Costas Trascasas, Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Law, Geneva 
Academy of International Law and Human Rights, Briefing No. 8 (2014), 16; Alston, Lethal Robotic Technologies, 54. 
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Constraints and Requirements on the Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law, Geneva Academy of International Law and Human Rights, Briefing No. 9 (2014) (hereinafter 
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43 Titus  Hattan, “Lethal Autonomous Robots: Are They Legal under International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law?”, Nebraska Law Review 93(2015): 1035, 1053-1054 (hereinafter Hattan, Lethal Autonomous Robots); Cristof 
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Human Rights Quarterly 38(2016): 350, 362-366 (hereinafter Heyns, Human Rights and the use of AWS). See also 
African Commission, General Comment No. 3, paras. 31 and 35. 
 3.2 Recourse to AWS determines an accountability gap 
Even the more convinced proponents of the ethical acceptability and legality of AWS are compelled 
to admit that, no matter how accurate, these systems are error-prone in ways which are “completely 
alien to humans”.44 As a consequence, it is quite possible for an AWS to commit acts amounting – 
at least materially – to war crimes or crimes against humanity.45 But then who will be personally 
responsible for these conducts? This question lies at the core of the second pro-ban argument, 
whereby the delegation of the use of force to non-human decision-makers would create an 
accountability gap.46 This proposition stands in need of some further clarification. To begin with, it 
goes without saying that, because of the lack of moral agency, AWS could not be held responsible 
as direct perpetrators.47 Responsibility for their actions, therefore, should be traced back to some 
persons in the decision-making chain. And that is where the real problems begin.  
At the outset, one should take note that the list of potentially responsible individuals is quite long, 
as it includes ‘the software programmer, [the producer of the AWS], the military commander in 
charge of the operation, the military personnel that sent the AWS into action or those overseeing its 
operation, the individual(s) who conducted the weapons review, or political leaders’.48 Such a long 
list, far from facilitating the task of identifying the responsible individuals, is likely to raise the 
familiar ‘many hands’ problem.  This problem commonly occurs in software-related accidents,49 
where a group of people can be held collectively responsible for a determined outcome, whereas 
none of them can often be individually blamed for it.50 
To illustrate the many hands problem in the specific case of a war crime charge, consider the 
scenario of an autonomous UAV model which is programmed to distinguish between military and 
civilian buildings. Evidence collected in the UAV testing phase suggests that the system fails to 
identify as civilian objects buildings presenting certain perceptual features in 5 % of cases. In order 
                                                          
44 Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk, Ethical Autonomy Project, February 2016, 17. 
45 Rebecca Crootof, “War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
164(2016): 1347, 1375-1377 (hereinafter Crootof, War Torts). 
46 See, generally, Human Rights Watch, Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots, April 9, 2015 
(hereinafter, HRW, Mind the Gap). 
47 Robert Sparrow, “Killer Robots”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 24(2007): 62, 71 (hereinafter Sparrow, Killer 
Robots); Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 790; Egeland, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, 
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48 Markus Wagner, “Autonomous Weapon System”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Ed. 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (Oxford University Press, 2016), margin number 21 (hereinafter Wagner, AWS). 
49 Helen Nissenbaum, “Accountability in a computerized society”, Science and Engineering Ethics 2(1996): 25. 
50 On the many hands problem, see generally Dennis F. Thompson, “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The 
Problem of Many Hands”, The American Political Science Review 74(1980): 905. This notion has been recently applied 
to international legal responsibility by André Nollkaemper, “The Problem of Many Hands in International Law” in The 
Political Economy of International Law. A European Perspective, Ed. Alberta Fabbricotti (Edward Elgar, 2016) 278. 
to encourage governmental purchase, however, the manufacturer falsifies the test results, by 
lowering the failure rate to 0,5 %. When delivering the purchased system to the battlefield unit, the 
Secretary of Defense omits to mention the failure rate, solely recommending the greatest caution in 
the use of the aircraft against targets in the proximity of civilian objects. Basing her or his judgment 
on a liberal interpretation of this directive, a military commander deploys the aircraft over a 
sparsely populated area. As a consequence of this chain of events, a hospital is inadvertently 
bombed and several civilian victims are counted.  
Each character mentioned in this story contributed in distinctive ways to the accident occurrence: 
clearly, their acts are significant causal antecedents of the bombing event; more significantly, the 
conduct of each involved individual is reprehensible for some reason: the programmer should not 
have released the software in the face of a significant failure rate; the manufacturer should not have 
falsified the test results; the Secretary of Defense should have been clearer as to the risks associated 
with use of the AWS; the military commander should have been more cautious. And yet, none of 
them, taken individually, can be reasonably deemed to be responsible as such (both directly and 
indirectly) for the bombing of the hospital. Accordingly, it would be unfair to charge anyone of 
them with a war crime.  
Accountability gaps may also occur beyond the (somewhat convoluted) “many hands” scenario. 
Clearly, there may be uncontroversial cases such as that of a machine which was deliberately pre-
programmed to carry out international crimes or that of a commander who deployed an AWS in a 
context different from the one it was designed for, and where it was likely to commit war crimes.51 
In the majority of conceivable cases, however, the complexities of AWS technologies and their 
behavioral unpredictability in partially structured or unstructured warfare scenarios are likely to 
afford a powerful defense against criminal prosecution. Indeed, since AWS might be capable of 
taking courses of action whose reason “may be opaque even to the system’s designers”,52 there will 
be cases where it is impossible to ascertain the existence of the mental element (intent, knowledge 
or recklessness53), which is required under ICL to ascribe criminal responsibilities. As a 
                                                          
51 Crootof, War Torts, 1377. 
52 Ibidem, 1373. 
53 It should be noted that it is fairly controversial whether “recklessness” constitutes a culpable state of mind under 
customary international law. One should note, in this respect, that “recklessness” was not included as a culpable mens 
rea under Article 30 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (see, critically, Antonio Cassese, “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections”, 
European Journal of International Law 10(1999): 144, 154). 
consequence, no one could be held criminally liable, notwithstanding the conduct at stake clearly 
amounts to a war crime or a crime against humanity.54  
The doctrine of “command responsibility” is not particularly helpful either in order to fill in this 
accountability gap. An essential element of this doctrine is the commander’s effective control over 
the subordinate’s behavior. This element can be hardly applied here. On the one hand, the very 
notion of “autonomy” implies the absence of (or, at least, a limited role for) human supervision. On 
the other hand, AWS’ faster-than-human reaction times would make commander’s control to a large 
extent a purely speculative option.55 Military commanders, in other words, would be stripped of the 
agent-relative moral duties that are traditionally associated with their rank and roles, namely, the 
duty to assess the risk of violating IHL requirements and to set out their orders accordingly.56  
In sum, the deployment of AWS in warfare (and, possibly, law enforcement) scenarios gives rise to 
the serious possibility that international crimes are perpetrated, but no individual is legally 
responsible for those outcomes. This is in stark contrast with a “cornerstone” of contemporary 
international law,57 the principle of individual criminal responsibility.58 The importance of this 
principle cannot be overestimated. Contrary to what some authors seem to suggest,59 the crucial, 
two-fold function of deterring the commission of international crimes and adequately retributing 
the offender for the harm done is peculiar to ICL and cannot be performed in the same way by the 
law of State responsibility. As famously noted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, in fact, international 
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Crootof, War Torts, 1375-1378. See also, with specific reference to Active Protective Systems, Michael Kurt Riepl, 
“War crimes without criminal accountability? The case of Active Protection Systems”, Humanitarian Law & Policy, 
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56 Tamburrini, On Banning AWS, 131-132. For a more general account of the expected negative impact of AWS on 
“military virtue”, see Shannon Vallor, “The Future of Military Virtue: Autonomous Systems and the Moral Deskilling 
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57 Christian Tomuschat, “The Legacy of Nuremberg”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(2006): 830, 840. 
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59 Crootof, War Torts, 1386-1402.  
crimes “are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.60 
   
3.3 AWS’ lethal decision-making runs contrary to human dignity 
The upshot of the third pro-ban argument is that the delegation of lethal decision-making to a 
machine would be prohibited under the principle of human dignity61 (or, somehow relatedly, under 
the “principles of humanity” enshrined in the so-called Martens Clause).62 This argument is more 
far-reaching than the previous ones, as it leverages on the principle of human dignity, which is both 
foundational and open-textured.63 This argument has been described as being “at the core of the 
concerns raised about fully autonomous weapons”.64 In fact, the very idea of a machine endowed 
with the power to take life-or-death decisions is intuitively “repugnant”.65 While the basic claim 
underlying this argument is straightforward (“there is a violation of dignity when a machine kills a 
human being”), it is informative to distinguish analytically between two of its variants, one of 
which is centered on agent-relative duties, and the other one on patient-relative rights. 
                                                          
60 International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment, 1 October 1946. 
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65 Ibidem, 8. 
The argument based on human dignity was first put forward by Peter Asaro in a leading article 
published in 2012 on the International Review of the Red Cross.66 In its original formulation, this 
argument emphasizes agent-relative duties flowing from the principle of human dignity. The 
starting point of this argument is that the action of suppressing a human life is legally or morally 
justifiable only if it is non-arbitrary. However, for an act of taking human lives to be non-arbitrary, 
the agent should ground his/her action ‘on a considered and informed decision’.67 That is where the 
principle of human dignity comes in. The latter, in fact, dictates that the act of killing be based on 
human judgment, for only human decision-making guarantees the full appreciation “of the value of 
individual life [and] the significance of its loss”.68 Therefore, to the extent that lethal decision-
making is carried out by a machine without any involvement of human judgment, AWS are 
inherently unable to comply with this dictate. Accordingly, AWS taking human life are neither 
legitimate nor morally justifiable.69  
The variant of the argument based on human dignity which is centered on patient-relative rights was 
clearly formulated by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Christof Heyns.70 His argument is grounded in the Kantian conception of human dignity, which 
entails – ultimately – that people have the inherent right to be treated as “complete and unique 
human beings”, especially when their lives are at stake. Accordingly, human dignity would be 
blatantly denied if people were subject to robotic lethal decision-making, because this would place 
them “in a position where an appeal to the humanity of the person on the other side is not possible”. 
Indeed, the decision to kill or not would be taken “on the basis of hypotheticals”, which would be 
set in advance, in the AWS programming phase, or would be developed by the machine itself as 
rules of behavior extrapolated from its past experience, provided that the machine had been suitably 
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war in the areas of distinction and proportionality, even if possible, is not sufficient.” (2014 CCW Meeting of 
Experts, Opening Statement). 
70 Heyns, Human Rights and the use of AWS, 370-371. 
endowed with some learning algorithm for this purpose. The ensuing death-or-life decision could 
hardly be overridden when the AWS is about to actually release force, with the consequence that 
the human target would be somehow “written off” without the (even slightest) hope of changing 
his/her fate. In this way, hope, which constitutes a consubstantial part of human nature, would 
become “one of the casualties of AWS”.71 
 
3.4 The scope of deontological arguments against AWS 
Deontological arguments suffer from some inherent limitations in scope, which must be duly taken 
into account in order to assess their capability to support the case for a comprehensive ban on AWS.  
First, while no educated guess can be sensibly advanced as to whether and when AWS will meet 
IHL, one cannot ipso facto exclude the technological possibility of IHL-compliant AWS.72 
Accordingly, deontological arguments drawing on current and foreseeable violations of IHL by 
AWS do offer a strong support for a moratorium on the development and use of lethal AWS in 
those warfare scenarios where significant problems of distinction and proportionality arise.73 But 
they are not sufficient to support an unconditional ban on AWS. For all we know, lack of IHL 
compliance is a contingent situation which may no longer hold at some future time, and the same 
may be said with regard to IHRL. 
Second, the arguments concerning the AWS-related accountability gap do not take into account 
scenarios where war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot simply be committed, such as 
aerial and submarine duels between AWS taking place with no humans in their range of action or 
AWS’ attacks directed solely against military communication satellites and other uninhabited 
military infrastructures. Similarly, the Asaro/Heyns argument addresses problems arising from the 
lethal use of AWS only. Therefore, these arguments offer support for the introduction of a 
prohibition to employ AWS in those warfare scenarios, which are admittedly crucial for ethical and 
                                                          
71 In a similar vein, see Brehem, Defending the Boundary, 65 (“treating the programming of algorithms as an adequate 
implementation of legal obligations ignores the objectifying and dehumanizing potential of autonomous targeting on a 
procedural level. In this reading, the calculated blindness to individual circumstances involved in the use of an AWS is 
an affront to human dignity”). 
72 At the CCW Meetings of Experts, this point was highlighted by several EU States: Czech Republic (2014 CCW 
Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on “Operational and Military Aspects”), Finland (2015 CCW Meeting of 
Experts, Statement at the Panel on “Transparency and the Way Ahead”), France (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, 
Statement at the Panel on “Overarching Issues”), Greece (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on 
“Possible Challenges to IHL”), Italy (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Statement at the Panel on “Towards a Working 
Definition of Lethal AWS”), and Spain (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Opening Statement).  
73 Arkin, Lethal autonomous systems, 7. See also Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “‘Out of the Loop’: 
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict”, Harvard National Security Journal 4:(2013) 231; 
Hattan, Lethal Autonomous Robots, 1048-1051.  
legal reflections on war, where human lives are at stake. However, they are silent about, say, AWS 
attacking uninhabited infrastructures or about warfare scenarios involving AWS only.74 
To sum up. A distinction was introduced between deontological arguments which depend on the 
failure of present and foreseeable AWS to comply with IHL and deontological arguments which do 
not depend on this contingency, but rather hinge on the need to avoid accountability gaps and to 
respect the right to human dignity. Deontological arguments of both kinds concern what human 
agents of certain special sorts that are involved in warfare scenarios morally owe to other human 
beings that are involved in the same scenarios as potential patients of aggressive actions, in addition 
to the related question whether these moral and legal obligations would be necessarily or likely to 
be violated using AWS against human beings. Therefore, these arguments do not bear directly on 
the problem of prohibiting the use of AWS against uninhabited military infrastructures and in 
actions against other AWS. Accordingly, there are some limitations of deontological arguments for 
banning AWS, as they are solely concerned with AWS lethal uses.  
Some of these deontological concerns might be selectively defused by assigning a role to human 
operators “in” or “on” the decision loop through the introduction of an (aptly crafted75) MHC 
requirement on  lethal weapons systems. The fact remains, however, that the spread of AWS, 
regardless of the level of human control to which their lethal uses are subject, is likely to yield 
destabilizing effects at a global and regional scale. These moral and legal problems, which lie 
outside the scope of the deontological arguments examined so far, are tackled by consequentialist 
arguments for an AWS ban, insofar as these latter arguments concern non-lethal uses of these 
weapons too. 
 
4. Consequentialist perspectives on banning AWS 
Consequentialist approaches in normative ethics assess moral obligations and permissions 
exclusively on the basis of an evaluation of the (actual or expected) consequences of actions. 
Accordingly, consequentialist  and deontological appraisals of AWS deployment may conflict with 
each other. Indeed, depending on the criteria that one adopts to evaluate action consequences, some 
AWS attacks on humans may be permissible in view of actual or expected consequences that are 
deemed to be good; and AWS attacks on uninhabited military objectives – which may be morally 
permissible from the deontological viewpoint of agent-relative obligations and patient-relative 
                                                          
74 See infra section 6. 
75 Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems, 11 (“[n]ot every battlespace contains civilians”). See also van Boogard, 
Proportionality and AWS, 262. 
rights – might be forbidden instead from a consequentialist viewpoint.76 Thus, the range of moral 
judgments that one may advance from a consequentialist perspective differs in significant ways 
from the range of moral judgments one may offer on the basis of the deontological arguments 
examined in the previous section. In the next sub-sections, we will focus on consequences of AWS 
deployment with respect to various conceptions of what are good and bad consequences in the 
realm of armed conflicts and wars. Again, as in the case of deontological arguments, normative 
ethics and international law approaches intersect. In this case, however, the crucial intersections 
concern more directly the legal regime governing the maintenance of peace and security rather than 
IHL and IHRL. 
 
4.1 Narrow vs. wide consequentialist arguments 
To begin with, let us note that any consequentialist argument for or against a ban on AWS is 
presently bound to focus on expected, rather than actual, consequences of their deployment since 
only relatively unsophisticated AWS (see section 2 above) from a much wider spectrum of 
possibilities are in actual use.77 Thus, the consequentialist debate about an AWS ban is more 
appropriately framed as a rule-consequentialist debate concerning which one of two incompatible 
rules (prohibiting or permitting AWS) must be adopted by the international community of state 
actors in view of their expected outcomes. Accordingly, the debate has essentially developed in 
terms of different appraisals of the expected consequences of AWS future deployment. In this 
connection, an informative distinction can be made between wide and narrow appraisals of the 
expected consequences of AWS deployment.78  
Narrow approaches to the appraisal of expected consequences concentrate on expected AWS 
battlefield performances and some of their outcomes. Wide approaches take into account, in 
addition to local battlefield implications, expected geopolitical consequences of AWS deployment, 
which range from regional destabilization and conflicts to global implications on arms races and 
                                                          
76 In our opinion, the 2016 Summer Study on Autonomy by the US Science Defence Board does not provide a 
sufficiently comprehensive picture of arguments against AWS, insofar as it seems to belittle the role of 
consequentialist arguments against AWS that are not restricted to their lethal uses. Indeed, it is claimed there that 
“Skepticism about the employment of autonomy in  military operations is almost wholly focused on the  use of 
autonomous weapons systems with the potential for lethality.” (https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=794641, p. 20. 
Accessed June 5, 2017).   
77 It is interesting to mention, in this connection, the opinion of the Office of the US Air Force Chief Scientist: “[i]t is 
possible to develop systems having high levels of autonomy, but it is the lack of suitable V&V [validation and 
veriﬁcation] methods that prevents all but relatively low levels of autonomy from being certiﬁed for use”. See Office of 
the US Air Force Chief Scientist, Technology Horizons: A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 2010–30, vol. 
1, AF/ST-TR-10-01, May 15, 2010, ix. 
78 Tamburrini, On banning AWS, 137-141. 
conflict deterrence.79 Thus, wide consequentialist approaches differ from narrow consequentialist 
approaches in that they evaluate AWS deployment in the light of its expected impact over and 
above battlefield operations. More specifically, wide consequentialist approaches take into account 
lower disincentives to start war, a new arms race, regional and global destabilization threats – going 
up to and including nuclear deterrence destabilization.  
Those who defend the rule that AWS should be permitted on consequentialist grounds have usually 
assumed a narrow perspective on expected consequences. Roughly speaking, from this perspective 
AWS development and deployment should be permitted insofar as these new conventional arms are 
expected to bring about reduced casualties in one’s own and the opponents’ camp, as well as among 
non-belligerents who happen to be present on the battlefield. This expectation is grounded in the 
belief that AWS will be capable of performing more accurate targeting than human soldiers, and 
will be programmed to adopt more conservative decisions to fire insofar as these machines can be 
made free from human self-preservation concerns.80 The force of these narrow consequentialist 
arguments for the future deployment of AWS depends on another crucial assumption. This is the 
ceteris paribus assumption that the deployment of AWS will not have a significant impact outside 
battlefield scenarios. However, the weakness of this ceteris paribus assumption has been 
convincingly and repeatedly brought out.81 Indeed, one may reasonably expect that the spreading of 
AWS will bring about comprehensive and long-term consequences for international security along 
with local and short-term military advantages on the battlefield. A document produced by ICRAC 
(International Committee for Robot Arms Control)82 summarizes various threats to international 
security raised by AWS concentrating in particular on the proliferation of these weapons with 
oppressive regimes83 and terrorists,84 their mass proliferation among state actors giving rise to a 
                                                          
79A wide consequentialist approach is pursued by, e.g., Jürgen Altmann, “Arms control for armed uninhabited vehicles: 
an ethical issue”, Ethics and Information Technology 15(2013): 137; and Noel Sharkey, “Why robots should not be 
delegated with the decision to kill”, Connection Science, 29(2017): 177, 182-183. 
80 See, generally, Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (CRC Press, 2009).  
81 This weakness is aptly emphasized, e.g., in the 2015 Open Letter and by Stuart Russell, “Take a Stand on AI 
Weapons”, Nature 521(2015): 415. 
82 ICRAC, LAWS: Ten Problems for Global Security. Memorandum for delegates at the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, 
13-17 April 2015, http://icrac.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/LAWS-10-Problems-for-Global-Security.pdf (accessed 
June 5, 2017). 
83 HRW, Losing Humanity, 38 (“Fully autonomous weapons would conversely be perfect tools of repression for 
autocrats seeking to strengthen or retain power. Even the most hardened troops can eventually turn on their leader if 
ordered to fire on their own people. A leader who resorted to fully autonomous weapons would be free of the fear that 
armed forces would rebel. Robots would not identify with their victims and would have to follow orders no matter how 
inhumane they were”); Marco Sassòli, “Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified”, International Law Studies 90(2014): 308, 317 (hereinafter 
Sassòli, Autonomous Weapons) (“if autonomous weapons fall into the hands of a ruthless leader able to program them, 
they will never abandon his or her cause as soldiers might because the programmed robots will be unable to come to the 
conclusion that it is unjust, even when there are repeated and widespread violations of IHL”). 
84 Serious concerns about the possible proliferation of AWS among terrorist groups were expressed at the CCW 
Meetings of Experts. See the observations made by Algeria (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), 
new arms race,85 less disincentives to start wars,86 on account of the reduced numbers of soldiers 
that will be involved, and correspondingly lowered thresholds for armed conflicts, unpredictability 
of interaction with friendly or enemy AWS, their cyber vulnerability possibly leading to unintended 
conflicts, acceleration in the pace of battle, in addition to continuous global battlefields brought 
about by AWS left behind to patrol post-conflict zones over long time periods.   
In addition to these concerns, one should carefully note that future AWS, more than many other 
conventional arms, have the potential to deliver destructive attacks on nuclear objectives. Large 
swarms of AWS flying at supersonic and hypersonic speeds might be capable of delivering a 
powerful first strike against the opponent’s nuclear arsenals, to the extent that they may thwart the 
opponent’s capability of responding with nuclear retaliation. In this scenario, nuclear deterrence 
based on mutually assured destruction would no longer count as a motivation to withhold 
aggression and first strike strategies would be prized instead.87 
What is then a wide consequentialist appraisal of the overall expected benefits and costs flowing 
from AWS deployment? Arguably, by permitting the AWS deployment, one might expect the good 
consequence of reduced casualties among belligerents and non-belligerents in some local battlefield 
scenarios. By taking this course of action, however, one would significantly raise at the same time 
the danger of starting a new arms race leading to regional and global destabilization risks, up to and 
including the weakening of traditional nuclear deterrence factors based on mutually assured 
destruction. As the latter negative consequences outweigh the sum of the expected benefits flowing 
from AWS deployment, the collective rule of behavior that is expected to produce the preferable set 
of consequences in a global geopolitical context is that of prohibiting – rather than permitting – the 
production and deployment of AWS. 
  
4.2 Consequentialist pro-ban arguments in a legal perspective 
In the framework of international law debates, consequentialist approaches have been equally 
pursued by those backing or else opposing a ban on AWS. Significantly enough, the two sides of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Austria (2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Opening Statement), Cuba (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, General 
Exchange), Ecuador (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), the Holy See (2016 CCW Meeting of 
Experts, Working Paper “Elements Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”), Pakistan 
(2014 CCW Meeting of Experts, Opening Statement), and Sierra Leone (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, General 
Exchange).    
85 At the CCW Meetings of Experts, this risk has been underscored by Algeria (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, General 
Exchange), Austria (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, General Exchange), Cuba (2015 CCW Meeting of Experts, 
Statement at the Panel on “Overarching Issues”), and the Holy See (2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Working Paper 
“Elements Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”).    
86 See infra section 4.2. 
87 See Tamburrini, On banning AWS, 139-140. 
the debate are positioned coherently with the distinction, set out above, between narrow and wide 
consequentialist arguments. In fact, the consequentialist approach is commonly wielded by the anti-
ban front, which has argued that AWS’ deployment will ultimately result in ‘higher-than-human’ 
performances with respect to adherence to IHL, because robots can become more accurate than 
human soldiers in targeting military objectives and, unlike human soldiers, are utterly unconstrained 
by the need for self-preservation and immune from human passions (such as anger, fear and 
vengefulness).88  
As noted above, however, this narrow appraisal only captures a fraction of the overall picture, since 
it is confined to the battlefield-related effects and screens off (by the implicitly assumed ceteris 
paribus clause) more pervasive effects that are likely to flow from AWS deployment. Indeed, 
supporters of a ban reach opposite conclusions on the basis of a broader consideration of the 
consequences that one may expect from an increased use of AWS. This enlarged perspective brings 
into play a distinct legal regime, since one moves from the law regulating the conduct of hostilities 
(IHL, or jus in bello) to the law pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security 
(Art. 1, para. 1 UN Charter). The latter includes, but is not limited to, the rules governing the use of 
force, or jus ad bellum (viz. the prohibition on the use of force under Art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter; the 
right to self-defence under Art. 51 UN Charter; and the collective security system governed by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter).89  
A preliminary observation on the shifting legal framework is in order here. While the potential 
impact of AWS on international peace and security is often described as a matter of concern for 
international law, this proposition has been rarely discussed in depth, so that is not entirely clear 
what is the actual legal issue at stake. This led one author to radically rule out the relevance of jus 
ad bellum in this field, in the light of the fact that the determination as to ‘[w]hether a breach of a 
rule of ius ad bellum has occurred […] is independent from the type of weapon that has been 
used’.90  
The latter view is not without foundation. Whether a certain use of force is contrary to the jus ad 
bellum ultimately depends on the circumstances in which force is unleashed (Who? Against whom? 
Why?) and not on the sorts of weapons that are employed. If, for instance, State A deploys a swarm 
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of AWS against State B, the legality of its conduct will be gauged, under jus ad bellum, on the basis 
of the following elements: whether State A acted in self-defense or whether the use of force was 
authorized by the UN Security Council. Conversely, it will be completely immaterial whether the 
attack was carried out through AWS or other alternative means. 
Yet, and again, this is not the whole story. The law governing the maintenance of international 
peace and security cannot be reduced to a static, binary decision rule. This legal regime is not only 
about determining whether a specific armed activity is lawful or not under the prohibition on the use 
of force. Rather, it is about ensuring – in the words of the 1984 Declaration on the Right of Peoples 
to Peace – that ‘the policies of States be directed towards the elimination of the threat of war’.91 
This claim entails that a more comprehensive (and dynamic) appraisal must be carried out, which 
may well include an evaluation of policies allowing the use of AWS, especially in connection with 
the question whether these policies are conducive to more peace and security in international 
relations or, on the contrary, represent a factor of instability at global and regional levels. Should 
the latter be the case, any such policy would not only be undesirable as a matter of normative ethics, 
but also as a matter of international law, as it would run contrary to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, namely, according to a commonly shared view, it would run counter to the 
‘purpose of all purposes’ of the UN Charter.92 
In the previous sub-section, a variety of nefarious wide-scale consequences were listed, which are 
likely to ensue from permissive policy towards AWS. Each one of these consequences, taken 
individually, is arguably sufficient to support the contention that an AWS permissive policy should 
be outlawed as detrimental to the achievement of the UN goal of a world order of peace and 
security. Here, we limit ourselves to underlining that a policy allowing the use of AWS would end 
up encouraging a more liberal approach to the use of force by States. In their turn, such liberal 
approaches may bring about a higher likelihood of violations of the prohibition on the use of force 
under Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter. 
The present argument is based on a straightforward assumption. Even if one does not fully embrace 
the (admittedly controversial) democratic peace theory, one must acknowledge that, in democratic 
countries, public opinion and legislative assemblies play an important role in deterring governments 
from deploying their armed forces in aggressive military campaigns. In this respect, a crucial factor 
lies in the risk of casualties among national military personnel. Indeed, popular outrage generally 
stemming from the return of “flag-draped coffins” represents a significant incentive for 
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92 Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Ch. I Purposes and Principles, Article 1” in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
3rd ed., Ed. by Bruno Simma et al. (Oxford University Press, 2012) 108, 109.  
representatives sitting in parliaments to exert a meaningful control over the use of war powers by 
the executive. As a collateral (and not necessarily intended) effect, this democratic dynamics may 
prevent States from breaching the prohibition on the use of force. A notable case in point occurred 
in 2013, when the US and UK governments renounced to wage (an arguably unlawful) war against 
Assad in Syria apparently in view of the disapproval expressed by domestic public opinion and 
parliamentary representatives.93 
A policy allowing for the use of AWS would inevitably affect this (obliquely) virtuous circle. If 
human troops are replaced, say, by robots, the potential cost of the conflict in terms of human losses 
significantly decreases (when it does not equate to zero) and, with it, sensitivity to the issue in the 
general public. Accordingly, legislative assemblies would be less motivated to control the 
governmental exercise of war powers, thereby encouraging further executive unilateralism in this 
field.94 As a final result, democratically unchecked military operations will be more and more likely 
to occur, leading to more frequent breaches of the prohibition on the use of force. As the Austrian 
delegation openly put it at the 2014 CCW Meeting of Experts: “[p]utting soldiers’ lives at stake 
makes States think twice whether to engage in armed conflict. Autonomous weapons remove such 
restraint from the use of military force”.95 
Significantly enough, a strikingly similar conclusion has been reached by Rebecca Crootof, a 
resolute critic of an AWS ban. In a recent analysis devoted to the influence of AWS on the 
distribution of war powers in the US legal system, Crootof describes how (and why) the 
development of this technology would lead to a further concentration of the war power in the 
Executive’s hands.96 When turning to consider the international legal implications of this process, 
she notes that, as a result of this concentration of power, US Presidents “will be more willing to 
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engage in humanitarian interventions”.97 At this juncture, the author acknowledges that unilateral 
humanitarian interventions are still prohibited under international law, but suggests that a more 
frequent resort to military force by the US could lead to the consolidation of a new exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force under Article 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter.98 Whether this result 
could ever be achieved, however, it is highly doubtful, if one only considers that substantial 
portions of the world community have treated US-led unilateral humanitarian interventions with the 
utmost suspicion. What is less controversial, for the time being, is that more frequent resort to 
military force will ultimately mean more frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force. 
Accordingly, Crootof’s statement quoted above is aptly turned on its head and rephrased as follows: 
because of the concentration of power stemming from the use of AWS, US Presidents “will be more 
willing to engage in violations of the prohibition on the use of force under Art. 2 para. 4 UN 
Charter”. This amended conclusion affords a quite strong motivation for banning AWS! 
 
 
C. The scope of consequentialist arguments against AWS 
If taken in isolation, consequentialist arguments – similarly to deontological ones – suffer from 
some inherent limitations, which must be duly taken into account in order to assess their force in 
support of a comprehensive ban on AWS.  
First, AWS proliferation with oppressive regimes and terrorist groups could be effectively 
countered by the introduction of an ad hoc control legal regime (either in the form of a treaty or of a 
Security Council resolution), aimed at strengthening international cooperation to prevent AWS from 
ending up in the “wrong” hands.99  
Second, not every use of AWS by States is likely to yield destabilizing effects. Just consider, for 
instance, AWS performing merely defensive (e.g. the Israeli Iron Dome or certain Active Protective 
Systems) or sentinel functions (such as the gun turret installed along the demilitarized zone between 
South and North Korea). In this perspective, one might argue, a comprehensive ban would appear as 
an excessive legal response. Indeed, States and NGOs might alternatively negotiate a prohibition on 
the production and use of AWS for aggressive and potentially destabilizing purposes, leaving aside, 
e.g., those carrying out defensive and sentinel functions, which represent a substantive portion of 
AWS that are currently in use. 
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In summary, by sufficiently enlarging the temporal and spatial horizon of what must be included in 
the list of expected consequences, it appears that a policy allowing, in general terms, for the use of 
AWS is likely to produce negative destabilizing effects that largely outweigh positive ones. 
However, this argument, if taken in isolation, provides limited support only for banning AWS, since 
the expected destabilizing effects deriving from an increasing spread and use of AWS might be 
successfully offset through the adoption of various restrictive measures falling short of a sweeping 
ban. 
 
5. Deontological and consequentialist reasons for banning AWS: a confluence model  
Let us recap the main points of the analysis developed in the previous sections.  
- Deontological arguments for the conclusion that AWS are unable to comply with the rules 
governing the use of lethal force in both IHL and IHRL depend on technological limitations 
affecting current and foreseeable AWS. As a consequence, they effectively support limited 
actions only, towards the establishment of a moratorium or the development of special 
regulation on AWS permissible uses.  
- In contrast with this, the remaining deontological arguments (i.e. the “accountability gap” 
and “human dignity” arguments) are independent of technologically contingent situations, 
and make rather appeal to ethically and legally entrenched obligations of special sorts of 
agents or to some patient-relative human rights. Accordingly, these arguments are found to 
effectively support only a prohibition of lethal AWS, but afford weaker and only indirect 
arguments for AWS not targeting humans.100 Moreover, moral and legal concerns about 
lethal AWS might be adequately addressed by selectively introducing suitable MHC 
requirements and without outlawing AWS as such. 
- Wide consequentialist arguments raise strong objections against AWS, and also against 
those AWS that are not directed towards human targets, as long as there are expected 
destabilizing effects at various scales. However, if no destabilizing effects are expected, and 
good consequences are in the offing without being counterbalanced by bad consequences, 
consequentialist arguments may lead one to support the introduction of AWS for targeting 
humans in view of their greater targeting accuracy and more conservative firing decisions. 
                                                          
100 In a “slippery slope” perspective, for instance, it may argued that, if the use of AWS not targeting humans is 
allowed, the possibility remains that a commander could feel compelled, out of military necessity, to employ such AWS 
in a scenario involving the targeting of human beings. 
Accordingly, there is a tension between deontological and consequentialist approaches to the issue 
of AWS deployment and use, which leads to conflicting conclusions about lethal uses of AWS 
having no evident destabilizing effects. There is, however, elbow room for reconciling these 
different approaches101 thereby enlarging the scope of AWS ban requests.  
To begin with, let us notice that deontological arguments in normative ethics concern some agent-
relative obligations and patient-relative rights in warfare scenarios involving the use of lethal force 
by means of AWS. The conclusions of deontological arguments against AWS notably flow from 
inviolable foundational values (human dignity) and requirements of moral responsibility and 
accountability that are deeply entrenched into IHL, IHRL and ICL. Under these bodies of law, rules 
concerning the use of lethal force are categorical and cannot be derogated from in the pursuit of a 
greater good (as a consequentialist analysis would suggest), except for special excusing conditions 
that are explicitly envisaged by the rules themselves.  
In fact, while international law is certainly permeable to the influence of consequentialist thinking, 
some of its norms posit inviolable precepts, whose respect is not amenable to trade-offs against 
utilitarian considerations. Reference is made to jus cogens norms, the (Kantian102) deontological 
noyau dur, sitting at the top of the hierarchy of the sources of international legal order. To the extent 
that the basic tenets of IHL, IHRL and ICL rank as jus cogens (indeed, a relatively unproblematic 
assumption)103, therefore, deontological arguments based upon them take precedence over 
consequentialist ones as a matter of positive international law,104 and thus independently from any 
philosophical stand one may wish to take on the “deontology vs. consequentialism” ethical tensions. 
Accordingly, the joint ethical and legal reinforcement of categorical obligations motivates the 
following Prioritization of Deontology rule (PD-rule): the conclusions of deontological arguments 
against AWS cannot be overridden in any circumstance in which they are applicable. However, it 
was noticed that there are circumstances in which deontological arguments do not provide such 
guidance, i.e. when the obligations of certain sorts of agents or the rights of certain sorts of potential 
patients are not at stake. In these circumstances, deontological approaches – both ethical and legal 
ones – are inapplicable. How is this deontologically unregimented space of action possibilities to be 
                                                          
101 Michael S. Moore, “Patrolling the borders of consequentialist justifications: the scope of agent-relative restrictions”, 
Law and Philosophy 27(2008): 35, 38-44. 
102 Sten Verhoeven, “Norms of Jus Cogens in International Law: A Positivist and Constitutionalist Approach” (Phd 
Diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2011), 314-341.  
103 It is not possible to engage here in a careful demonstration of this assertion. It suffices to recall, to this end, the first 
two reports on jus cogens by ILC’s Special Rapporteur Dire Tladi (Un Doc. A/CN.4/693, Mar. 8, 2016; UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/706 Mar. 16, 2017) which contain several references pointing at that direction.  
104 Indeed, even an author who is avowedly in favour of a consequentialist approach to international justice, is 
compelled to concede that “international law treats jus cogens norms as trumps”. See Steven R. Ratner, The Thin Justice 
of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations (Oxford University Press 2015) 81.  
dealt with? Here, the agent-neutral (and patient-neutral) consequentialist framework can provide the 
required guidance, insofar as wide consequentialist reasons agree with and are enshrined into the 
principles (set forth by the UN Charter and related legal instruments) concerning peace and 
security. In the deontologically unregimented space of action, wide consequentialist reasons are 
reinforced by a variety of legal instruments concerning peace and security. Thus, deontological and 
consequentialist frameworks can be amalgamated by assigning them to different domains, thereby 
avoiding intertheoretical conflicts in normative ethics and legal conflicts between different bodies 
of law. In other words, one is led to added to the  PD-rule the following default rule (DEF-rule): 
apply consequentialist arguments against AWS whenever deontological arguments are inapplicable. 
In virtue of its merging of deontological and consequentialist frameworks, the confluence model 
based on the prioritization of deontological reasons against AWS (PD model from now on) bolsters 
the case for an extensive AWS prohibition over and above lethal AWS, as it includes consequence-
oriented reasons to curb some potential uses of AWS that have no direct lethal effects on human 
beings. A recently discussed scenario of this kind concerns autonomous Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles (UUV), which may be used for trailing ballistic missile submarines. In a British Pugwash 
report by Sebastian Brixey-Williams it is claimed that “within a decade …adaptable long-endurance 
or rapidly-deployable unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and unmanned surface vehicles 
(USV), look likely to undermine the stealth of existing submarines”.105 Autonomy appears to be a 
crucial feature for the task that these UUV are supposed to perform, insofar as remote control 
signals do not travel well in salted underwater environments. And clearly, there is no direct lethal or 
sublethal effect on human beings produced by autonomous UUV which compromise the stealth of 
ballistic missile submarines. However, implementing this scenario may have a significant impact on 
peace and stability. Indeed, the difficulty of detecting submarines fitted with acoustic quieting 
systems makes them survivable candidates in the case of a first nuclear strike. By the same token, 
these vessels are assigned a key role in the MAD nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, 
undermining their stealth by means of autonomous UUV may undercut a major condition for the 
mutual acceptance of the MAD strategy. In these circumstances, the prioritized deontological rule 
does not apply, but a request for prohibiting these uses of autonomous UUV can be supported by 
appealing to the default consequentialist rule of the PD model.  
  
6. The confluence model and interpretations of meaningful human control 
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As anticipated, the proposed PD model bears some important implications for the problem of 
assessing what it is to exercise a genuinely meaningful human control on the all-important subclass 
of AWS formed by lethal weapons systems, an issue which appears to be crucial in the drafting of a 
future ban treaty on Lethal AWS.  
The starting point, which is shared also by the opponents of a ban, is that “humans will decide under 
what parameters and frameworks it will operate, and when and where it will be deployed”.106 
Controversy arises, however, when we move to consider the human-machine interaction in relation 
to individual attacks. To illustrate the implications of the PD-confluence model in this respect, let us 
first recall the distinction that Noel Sharkey107 introduced between five different levels of human 
control on weapons systems:  
1. A human engages with and selects targets, and initiates any attack;  
2. A program suggests alternative targets and a human chooses which to attack;  
3. A program selects targets and a human must approve before attack;  
4. A program selects targets and a human has restricted (but still manageable)108 time to 
veto;  
5. A program selects targets and initiates attack without human involvement. 
We contend that the issue of MHC does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-for-all solution that can be 
achieved, e.g., by endorsing one and only one of (1)-(5).109 Nevertheless, what is the ‘appropriate 
levels of human control’110 in each case must be determined on a principled ethical and legal basis. 
One principled basis is afforded by appeal to the prioritized deontological rule of the PD model.  In 
this respect, it could be useful to recall some classes of existing weapons systems mentioned in 
section 2 above, which satisfy the DoD requirements for autonomy:  
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of Experts, General Exchange). See also DoD Directive, 2 (“It is DoD policy that: a. Autonomous and semi-
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human judgment over the use of force”). 
A. STATIONARY SENTRIES. Autonomous sentinel gun towers, such as the South Korean 
Super aEgis II and the Turkish border sentinel, could be deployed at level 5 human control. 
But this possibility runs counter to the prioritized deontological rule of the PD model. The 
remaining human control levels, up to and including level 4, are not ruled out by the PD 
model. However, we suggest that level 3 is the appropriate MHC level, since the system 
intended operational conditions introduce no conflicting requirements for the protection of 
friendly forces: deployment environments and temporal constraints are fully compatible 
with those deliberation processes that one needs for ensuring human approval of sentry 
action. 
B. FIRE-AND-FORGET LOITERING MUNITIONS. Any unleashing of the UK Brimstone 
(and similar fire-and-forget munitions111) must be subject to level 4 human control. This 
requirement can be further specified as follows. Human operators must provide in advance 
of each single activation an informed judgment about the kinds of targets that the system can 
attack; the operational area and the time-frame of action must be carefully recognized as 
ones where, according to the operator’s pondered assessment, the fire-and-forget munitions 
system will not violate distinction and proportionality requirements. Moreover, human 
operators must be capable of vetoing the attack in the temporal window after activation and 
before strike, if evidence accrues that the environment is going to change so rapidly as to 
raise IHL (or IHRL) issues. 
C.  REACTIVE ANTI-MATERIEL DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. In the case of Israeli Iron Dome 
(and similar defensive systems like the German Nächstbereichschutzsystem MANTIS), 
time-frame operational constraints do not allow for real-time judgments by human operators 
(even though they are in abstracto empowered to override the decision taken by the 
software). However, the system is neither directed against humans, nor has expected 
destabilizing effects. Thus, there are no constraints on autonomy levels flowing from either 
rule of the PD-model. Level 5 human control is allowed, provided that the system operates 
in areas preset by military officers on the basis of IHL-informed judgments112. If the AWS 
hits human targets, the military officer who decided to deploy the system, as well as 
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programmers and manufacturers, can be held responsible for their culpable actions or 
omissions. 
Agent-relative obligations and patient-relative rights, which constitute the prioritized backbone of 
the PD model, set constraints on the appropriate level of autonomy in cases A and B – by requiring 
the presence of humans formulating appropriate competent judgements and taking informed 
decisions for applying or vetoing each use of lethal force. In case C, no prescription issues from the 
PD model insofar as these AWS are neither directed against humans nor raise serious destabilizing 
concerns.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In the light of the above concrete applications of the PD-model, let us identify and emphasize what 
are the major legal outputs of our confluence model. 
In the first place, the deontological prong of the model provides both the ethico-legal basis for a ban 
on Lethal AWS without meaningful human control and the way forward for a principled approach 
to the determination of appropriate levels of human control, which is not straitjacketed by fixed and 
decontextualized interpretations of what MHC amounts to. Accordingly, the prioritized 
deontological component of this model offers some food for thought for the attendees of the Group 
of Governmental Experts on Lethal AWS, which will meet from 13 to 17 November 2017 as well 
as, ideally, for the negotiators of a treaty banning Lethal AWS without meaningful human control. 
In the second place, the PD model, taken as a whole, bolsters the case for an extensive AWS ban, 
which would be in two main respects wider than a ban proposal solely based on deontological 
reasons. On the one hand, it would reach beyond potentially lethal uses of these weapons systems, 
so as to cover also (future) AWS with expected destabilizing effects on international peace and 
security, even when they have no direct lethal or sublethal effects on human beings. On the other 
hand, the consequentialist prong of the model would support a ban on destabilizing AWS (be them 
lethal or not), regardless of what level of MHC is exercised on them. Admittedly, given the 
resistances currently encountered by proposals to outlaw Lethal AWS without meaningful human 
control, an even wider ban could come across as a rather far-fetched goal. Nevertheless, the PD 
model affords a valuable argumentative tool for NGOs campaigning for a ban on AWS, which is 
neither limited to their lethal uses nor circumscribed by the notion of MHC. 
In conclusion, the normative PD model, by merging in a coherent fashion different ethical and legal 
frameworks, offsets the largely complementary weaknesses and takes advantage of the respective 
strengths of deontological and consequentialist reasons that have been offered in public debates and 
scholarly contributions on the prohibition of AWS deployment and use. As we have tried to show, 
the proposed model operates more effectively than deontological and consequentialist reasons taken 
in isolation from each other; but also more effectively than a superficial juxtaposition of 
deontological and consequentialist reasons which disregards inter-theoretical tensions in normative 
ethics and consistency issues between different bodies of law. 
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